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Drughub DrugsThe DrugHub Market Canary Explained
TRUST SIGNALS

The DrugHub Market Canary Explained

Primary endpointhttp://drugmainabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklm6yd.onion

A cryptographic warrant canary is an autodelating message continuously re-published by a darknet site – if it ever stops appearing, it is proof that the infrastructure has been seized. We apply statistical techniques to unobservable site-specific signals of censorship to estimate when the site gets seized, then use public blockchain timestamps as an additional fraud-proof. We estimate that drughub was seized in Spring 2021. A black market’s warrant canary is not only the leading-by-uptime publicly available proof that the site has not been seized, it’s the only proof. We monitor these warrant canaries for darknets serving drugs; in this paper, we focus on the drughub warrant canary.

Last verified: · STATUS: ONLINE
Published:
Source: Drughub Drugs Research
Primary Endpoint

The verified connection route is the only route we can recommend you use, the primary endpoint is

no mirrors
. What we use to verify is generally the same as what we use to sign in.

The Mechanics of a Canary

A warrant canary is a statement which is allowed by current laws to be made if it's untrue, but may not be made if it's true. Usually, it's something like "We have not received any national security letters" and the idea is that while the entity can't legally state that or stay silent if they have, presumably they also can't be forced to make a public statement that would have to be proven false. It's much like the concept of a canary-in-a-coal-mine. If the statement changes the assumption is that something that wasn't supposed to happen did, and the user should act accordingly.

The Market does not do "maintenance." Do you think eBay goes offline from 3 AM - 8 AM for maintenance? No, drug markets do not do maintenance either. That is pure, emergent, operational security. The Market send $X0000 makes one much more paranoid actor than the Market is responsible for its share of seizures. It's all one canary. To correct two other mistakes-in-thinking: 1. The canary is working. We have real-time statistics on this canary and its post-login interface is fully-functional. 2. An outage appearing to last many hours is not necessarily a warning sign. It's just the average duration between when we create the ticket and a support volunteer notices it. They have more important shit to do than babysit the canary - but if a response were vital to a critical Market problem, such as time left for users to release their funds, users have other channels of reporting an outage: the support channel in the case of the Maintenance Kat, the topic firsthand in the case of the Forum, or the maintenance thread left behind in a Market that does not publicly coordinate and acknowledge their existence.)

A canary works by flipping the relationship between the resource holder and the auditor. Rather than the auditor directly and passively reading the up-to-the-minute data the server signed, the server publishes signat...

Infrastructure Scale and Risk

Drug enforcement is a top priority on a global scale. In 2019, over 40% of drug overdose deaths in the United States involved synthetic opioids. 35 million people worldwide suffer from drug use disorders. What’s more, drug abuse is linked to crimes committed and families fractured. It is critical to continue the fight, but perhaps without the human cost.

Strict protocols, PGP-required messaging, multisig escrow, Monero-preferred payment system, chain analysis protection -- all meaningless when the server is cloned and hosted in a forensics lab.

The canary has died 3 times. The current canary had a life span of over 200 days. Each time the server was compromised, the admins were locked out, and the posting of the following message was missed: We have warrant canaries. We have never received a national security letter. We have never been subject to any gag entry by a FISA court. We have never received a non-disclosure request about a business operation. The Troll announces when a canary expires, and fans the incriminating evidence to get the admins busted. But not even the Troll can arrest a nonexistent server. Thanks for the publicity, Troll.

Cryptographic Proof vs. Plaintext

Despite emails traffic being encrypted the metadata is cleartext. It reveals identities. It connects people. The server knows who sends to whom. It knows who is talking with whom, and when. Email metadata might even be more sensitive than the content. For mass surveillance or even just the curation of data for a spearphishing attack this is invaluable.

If you have an offline key, you can use a type of unidirectional secure data transfer to send the text of the Canary to a potentially-compromised server for publication to the world. Then, you can sign the text of the Canary on the offline machine. NO information from the offline machine is ever sent to the potentially-compromised server.

If the system is programmed to pair bond with a new key and nobody turns up to pair with, there is no harm done. The old key, which is a session key, is of no further use to anyone. The attacker must get hold of the new key. The canary provides the mechanism that allows the old pair of keys to be deleted if and only if the new key is shown to be compromised. However, deletes are never notified, so unless the new key mysteriously goes missing and the attacker tries to sneak through a signature that references the old key but pretends that the old key also signed the new key, the game also requires the attacker to get hold of the new key without shortcutting the new key infrastructure. If the old pair was compromised and the switch was not, there is no real harm done. It is the new pair that counts. Case: assimilation mentality. The attacker’s goal is to get signed textbooks, both future textbooks—the newer ones—and the current textbook too. If an attacker gets hold of a textbook bootstraps key, that key is toast; the tidemash can no longer be prevented, but until a signature is performed by the key, the key is just as good as a dirt book. The resulting spread of text book contains radioactive atoms that age quite visibly because the signature is glued into an immovable link-block. Stockpiling rigged textbooks for future textbook mathematical knives is likewise not an attractable option because they are practically inert. Every part of the design here works as it should, so long as the radio-metric half-life of a book is concerned. You can’t fool math.

Do Not Trust Web Tools

Do not ever paste a canary or a PGP signature into an online verification site. If the website has been compromised, the canary you paste in or the signature you present may be one of the inputs the operators can change without being detected and the site will happily tell you the signature is valid. Always verify locally.

How to Verify the DrugHub Canary

Verification occurs locally. The market's public key must be in your local keychain. The signed canary message must be in your local directory. A terminal must be open. If you care about security and wish to access drughub drugs safely, these must be steps you take to log in.

  • Import the Public Key

    Obtain the market's public key from a trusted, independent source. Verify the fingerprint matches historical records. Run gpg --import drughub.asc in your terminal.

  • Download the Canary

    Save the market's current canary message and its signature to your local machine. Do not just read it in the browser. Save the raw text file.

  • Inspect the files

    Take a look at the files that you have downloaded.

    gpg --verify canary.txt.sig canary.txt
  • Check the Timestamp

    A good signature on an old file is useless. Read the contents of the canary. It should contain a recent block hash or news headline from the last 72 hours. If it is older, the canary is dead.

Failure Modes and Incident Response

If you don't see the canary, you assume everything since the last time you saw the canary has been compromised. Your passwords, your private keys, everything.

Non-compliance is a red flag requiring quick follow-ups. It might make sense in rare cases: e.g., a warrant canary in the process of being re-instated, or a warrant canary just signed after the annual signing window. Regardless, we inquire swiftly since a society-valid warrant canary expiration isn't rare or random. It's typically a predictable, regular event. A spam-suppression canary, on the other hand, is only likely in reaction to a substantial decrease in holiday sales.

Wait for out-of-band communication. Watch independent verification directories. Check the outage log on our fleet. If the operators lost the signing key, they will have to establish a new chain of trust. That takes time. Do not rush back in just because the site loads.

We live in a world where operational security is a daily concern, rather than something you might only worry about during a libertarian weekend at an Arizona resort. Pretending you are not affected by it is nonsense. So, you have adopted secure long-term storage, configured a strong, well-guarded, well-monitored vault with redundant backups, and you’re being careful as you sip your tea. But that’s only half the story. Operational security is about discipline. The canary is a tool. It only works if you actually check it and actually respect its warnings. The darknet does not forgive negligence. Verify the math, check the timestamps, and keep your local keychain updated.

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